Frédéric Dessberg: Le triangle impossible: Les relations franco-soviétiques et le facteur polonais dans les questions de sécurité en Europe (1924–1935). Bruxelles: Lang, 2009. 440 S., 4 Tab. = Enjeux internationaux, 2. ISBN: 978-90-5201-466-1

Frédéric Dessberg: Le triangle impossible: Les relations franco-soviétiques et le facteur polonais dans les questions de sécurité en Europe (1924–1935). Bruxelles: Lang, 2009. 440 S., 4 Tab. = Enjeux internationaux, 2. ISBN: 978-90-5201-466-1.

International relations in inter-war Europe have been examined in great detail. It appears that there is already enough literature to keep any student busy for a long time. And yet new studies are written and new perspectives proposed, prompted in part by new sources. The present fine book by Frédéric Dessberg is one of them.

Dessberg focuses on the “Polish factor” in the tortuous diplomacy of France in relations with the Soviet Union. The “Polish factor” was no minor issue. It was in fact the central issue of security in inter-war Europe because it literally embodied the unsettled state of affairs created by the Versailles system. Poland had been resurrected after more than a century of extinction. Yet it had the misfortune of being sandwiched between two mighty countries, Germany and Soviet Russia (which became the Soviet Union in 1922 by absorbing Ukraine, Belarus’ and other territory). Moreover, Germany had been excluded from the negotiations at Versailles, while Soviet Russia had not taken part. As a result, Poland had every reason to fear that its independence and territory, secured by Versailles, could be threatened by the two states that were not party to Versailles. Its fears were justified in the end: Poland was destroyed by these two countries, and with it World War Two began.

Poland traditionally turned to France for protection. France, in turn, retained special interests in and special ties to the predominantly Catholic state between Germany and Russia. In the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–21, France actively assisted the newly independent country. In 1921 Poland and France concluded a defensive alliance that was maintained throughout the inter-war period. In 1922, however, Poland’s two neighbors came to a rapprochement, concluding the Rappalo treaty. By 1925, Germany also came to a sort of rapprochement with Western Europe, France included, in the form of the Locarno Treaty. Locarno alienated Poland by leaving Germany’s eastern borders open for revision while guaranteeing its western borders. Dessberg demonstrates that ultimately the geopolitical interests of France and Poland diverged so much that in spite of France’s good will, they failed to find mutually acceptable terms. France’s strategy was to keep Germany and the Soviet Union from working together to revise the Versailles settlement. For all its good will towards Poland, France never acknowledged Poland as an equal partner. In response, Poland sought the status of a “regional power,” independent of France (p. 317). This manifested itself in a strategy of “balanced diplomacy” between Poland’s two powerful neighbors, which in itself provided no security, however. France’s efforts to conclude an “Eastern Locarno” for Poland (which would have guaranteed Poland’s western borders) failed, in part because it did not guarantee Poland’s eastern borders, an equally important issue for Poland.

Dessberg amply demonstrates that each country pursued its own interests. None of the parties, neither Paris nor Warsaw nor Moscow, excluded a rapprochement with Germany. Following a non-aggression pact with Moscow in 1932, Warsaw concluded a similar one with Berlin in 1934. Furthering its own 1932 pact of non-aggression with Moscow, Paris concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Moscow in 1935. This was a hollow agreement, however, devoid of military conventions. Its ratification in 1936 gave Hitler a pretext to advance his military forces into the demilitarized Rhineland, a clear violation of the Versailles treaty. Subsequently, in 1939 Moscow struck a Faustian deal with Berlin.

All this is not new. However, Dessberg lucidly details, with new information, the painful choices each country had to make under difficult circumstances. This is the most important contribution of the present book. All the same, Dessberg could have done more. For instance, it is difficult to understand fully the European situation after 1931 without considering the international situation in the Far East: Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the foundation of Manchu-kuo, Japan’s puppet government, in 1932. These events deeply affected the European political scene as well.

Dessberg is sympathetic with Poland’s quandary. This should be noted in the light of the fact that some Russian historians now blame Poland for allegedly causing World War Two!

Hiroaki Kuromiya, Bloomington, IN

Zitierweise: Hiroaki Kuromiya über: Frédéric Dessberg: Le triangle impossible: Les relations franco-soviétiques et le facteur polonais dans les questions de sécurité en Europe (1924–1935). Bruxelles: Lang, 2009. 440 S., 4 Tab. = Enjeux internationaux, 2. ISBN: 978-90-5201-466-1, http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/JGO/Rez/Kuromiya_Dessberg_Le_triangle_impossible.html (Datum des Seitenbesuchs)

© 2012 by Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg and Hiroaki Kuromiya. All rights reserved. This work may be copied and redistributed for non-commercial educational purposes, if permission is granted by the author and usage right holders. For permission please contact redaktion@osteuropa-institut.de

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